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四年专利纠纷落幕!华为在美专利案获胜

发布时间:2019.10.12 北京市查看:2937 评论:20

四年专利纠纷落幕!华为在美专利案获胜

https://www.laoyaoba.com/html/share/news?source=app_android_v2&news_id=730936

集微网消息(文/小山),据一份美国联邦巡回法院文书显示,关于加州男子黄晓华对华为提起的专利诉讼案已有结果,法院维持原审法官驳回黄的诉讼的裁决。
2015年,黄晓华首次起诉华为并声称,华为含有某些第三方芯片的存储电路产品侵犯了其编号为RE 45259、6744653和6999331的美国专利。2016年,黄晓华试图在诉讼中增加数十种专利被侵权的产品信息,但该动议遭地区法院驳回。
黄晓华却并未就此作罢,继续在德克萨斯州东部地区法院提起诉讼,但法院最后判决华为在2015年的诉讼里不涉及专利侵权行为,黄晓华随即提出上诉请求。
但本周当地时间周三,美国联邦巡回上诉法院于为这起长达四年之久的诉讼纠纷画上了一个休止符。
美国联邦巡回上诉法院裁定, 由于地方法院裁定的两起案件中涉及的芯片基本相同,而德克萨斯州地区法院对华为不涉侵权的裁定足以排除有争议的索赔。换句话说,德克萨斯州的法官驳回诉讼的判决是正确的,即华为没有侵犯专利行为。(校对/holly)


标签: 专利 华为 行业动态 出海美国


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  • 第1楼
    本帖最后由 siceng 于 2019-10-12 15:37 编辑

    HUANG v. HUAWEI TECHNOLOGIES CO., LTD.
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    No. 2019-1726.




    XIAOHUA HUANG, Plaintiff-Appellant. v. HUAWEI TECHNOLOGIES CO., LTD., Defendant-Appellee.

    United States Court of Appeals, Federal Circuit.
    Decided: October 9, 2019.




    Attorney(s) appearing for the CaseXIAOHUA HUANG, Los Gatos, CA, pro se.
    SCOTT W. BREEDLOVE, Carter Arnett, PLLC, Dallas, TX, for defendant-appellee. Also represented by E. LEON CARTER.
    Before PROST, MOORE and WALLACH,



    NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.
    PER CURIAM.
    Xiaohua Huang appeals a decision of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas granting summary judgment in favor of Huawei Technologies Co. Ltd. ("Huawei"). See Huang v. Huawei Techs. Co., No. 16-CV-00947-JRG-RSP, 2019 WL 1246260 (E.D. Tex. Feb. 12, 2019), report and recommendation adopted, No. 16-CV-00947-JRG-RSP, 2019 WL 1239433 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 18, 2019). Mr. Huang also appeals an order of the district court denying his motion to transfer. See J.A. 115-17. Because the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Mr. Huang's motion to transfer and because Mr. Huang's claims are barred by claim preclusion and the Kessler doctrine, we affirm.
    BACKGROUND
    Mr. Huang filed a first lawsuit against Huawei in the Eastern District of Texas on August 14, 2015. Huang v. Huawei Techs. Co., 2:15-cv-1413-JRG-RSP (E.D. Tex. Aug. 14, 2015) ("Case 1"). He alleged that Huawei products containing certain third-party chips infringed U.S. Patent Nos. RE 45,259, 6,744,653, and 6,999,331.
    On June 1, 2016, Mr. Huang moved for leave to amend his December 1, 2015 infringement contentions. He sought to add dozens of new accused products and product families. The district court denied his motion.
    Mr. Huang then filed the present action in the Eastern District of Texas. Huang v. Huawei Techs. Co., 2:16-cv-00947-JRG-RSP (E.D. Tex. Aug. 26, 2016) ("Case 2"). He alleged infringement of the patents asserted in Case 1 by the products he had attempted to add to Case 1.
    Meanwhile, the court granted summary judgment of noninfringement in Case 1. Mr. Huang appealed.
    Huawei then moved for summary judgment in Case 2 based on claim preclusion and the Kessler doctrine, Kessler v. Eldred, 206 U.S. 285 (1907). The district court stayed Case 2 pending the resolution of Mr. Huang's appeal in Case 1. On June 8, 2018, this Court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in Case 1. Huang v. Huawei Techs. Co., 735 F. App'x 715, 722 (Fed. Cir. 2018), cert. denied, 139 S.Ct. 2623 (2019). Following that decision, Mr. Huang moved to transfer venue in Case 2 to the Northern District of California. After lifting the stay, the district court denied that motion. Then, finding that the Case 2 accused products are "essentially the same" as those accused in Case 1, the district court entered summary judgment for Huawei based on claim preclusion.
    Mr. Huang appeals. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1). For the reasons stated below, we hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Mr. Huang's motion to transfer venue and did not err in deciding that Mr. Huang is precluded from pursuing his claims of infringement in Case 2.
    DISCUSSION

    I
    We review a district court's ruling on a motion to transfer venue under 28 U.S.C. § 1404 under the law of the regional circuit, in this case the Fifth Circuit. In re Link_A_Media Devices Corp., 662 F.3d 1221, 1222-23 (Fed. Cir. 2011). In the Fifth Circuit, the decision whether to transfer venue under § 1404 is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Peteet v. Dow Chem. Co., 868 F.2d 1428, 1436 (5th Cir. 1989). An abuse of discretion may be found where the district court's decision relies on an erroneous view of the law or on a clearly erroneous view of the evidence. Esmark Apparel, Inc. v. James, 10 F.3d 1156, 1163 (5th Cir. 1994).
    Section 1404 grants the district court discretion to transfer a case "[f]or the convenience of parties and witnesses" and "in the interest of justice." Mr. Huang argues that transfer was proper because it was both in the interest of justice and more convenient. Neither argument has merit. First, he alleges that Huawei had undue influence over the proceedings in the Eastern District of Texas. He claims that Huawei "retained the lawyers having interest conflict with the Judge to avoid paying the royalty." Appellant's Br. at 70. Mr. Huang proffers no evidence of the alleged conflict.
    Second, Mr. Huang argues that the Northern District of California would be more convenient based on the parties' presence there. Id. at 68. Mr. Huang chose, however, to file in the Eastern District of Texas despite residing in California. J.A. at 116. Mr. Huang's decision weighs heavily against any argument that the Eastern District of Texas is inconvenient. Neither of Mr. Huang's arguments evidence an erroneous view of the law or clearly erroneous view of the evidence by the district court. Thus, we do not find an abuse of discretion in the district court's denial of Mr. Huang's motion.
    II
    We review a district court's grant of summary judgment under the law of the regional circuit. Mohsenzadeh v. Lee, 790 F.3d 1377, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2015). The Fifth Circuit reviews grants of summary judgment de novo. Keelan v. Majesco Software, Inc., 407 F.3d 332, 338 (5th Cir. 2005). Summary judgment is appropriate where there is no genuine dispute of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Johnson v. World All. Fin. Corp., 830 F.3d 192, 195 (5th Cir. 2016). A dispute is genuine if a reasonable fact finder could find for the nonmoving party. Id.
    The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Huawei because Huang's claims were barred by claim preclusion. Whether a cause of action is barred by claim preclusion is a question of law, which we review de novo,applying the law of the regional circuit. SimpleAir, Inc. v. Google LLC, 884 F.3d 1160, 1165 (Fed. Cir. 2018). The test for claim preclusion in the Fifth Circuit has four elements: (1) the parties in the subsequent action are identical to, or in privity with, the parties in the prior action; (2) the judgment in the prior case was rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction; (3) there has been a final judgment on the merits; and (4) the same claim or cause of action is involved in both suits. Duffie v. United States, 600 F.3d 362, 372 (5th Cir. 2010).
    Because the parties are identical, the judgment in the prior case was rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction, and the earlier judgment is final, the parties' dispute centers on the fourth element of claim preclusion, whether the same cause of action is involved in both suits. We apply our own law to resolve whether two patent causes of action are the same. Senju Pharm. Co. v. Apotex Inc., 746 F.3d 1344, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
    Claim preclusion in a patent case typically exists when a patentee attempts to assert the same patent against the same party and the same subject matter. Id.Subject matter is the same for claim preclusion purposes if the earlier accused devices and the devices accused in the current action are "essentially the same." Foster v. Hallco Mfg. Co., 947 F.2d 469, 479-80 (Fed. Cir. 1991). Devices are "essentially the same" if they are "materially identical." Nystrom v. Trex Co., 580 F.3d 1281, 1285-86 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
    Here, the district court found that there was no genuine dispute that the accused devices in Case 1 and Case 2 are essentially the same. See Huang, 2019 WL 1246260, at *5. We agree. A comparison of the infringement charts filed in each case reveals that the charts are identical, mapping each other word-for-word. Any alleged difference between the accused products in each case is therefore unrelated to the limitations in the claim of the patents. Acumed LLC v. Stryker Corp., 525 F.3d 1319, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2008). Thus, the Case 2 chips are essentially the same as the Case 1 chips for purposes of claim preclusion.1
    CONCLUSION
    We have considered Mr. Huang's remaining arguments, but find them unpersuasive. For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court's denial of Mr. Huang's request to transfer venue and grant of summary judgment.
    AFFIRMEDCOSTS
    No costs.
    FootNotes
    1. As for post-judgment activity, the district court findings that the Case 1 and Case 2 chips are essentially the same and its finding of non-infringement in Case 1, suffice to preclude the claims at issue. See Brain Life, 746 F.3d at 1056-57 (citing Kessler, 206 U.S. at 285-89).

    2019/10/12 11:01 [来自北京市]

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  • 第2楼
    HUANG v. HUAWEI TECHNOLOGIES
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    No. 18-1275.




    XIAOHUA HUANG, v. HUAWEI TECHNOLOGIES.

    Supreme Court of the United States.
    October 7, 2019.





    The motion for leave to file a petition for rehearing is denied.






    2019/10/12 11:06 [来自北京市]

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  • 第3楼
    本帖最后由 siceng 于 2019-10-12 11:59 编辑

    2016年的case 2,如下
    XIAOHUA HUANG v. HUAWEI TECHNOLOGIES CO.
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    Case No. 2:16-cv-00947-JRG-RSP.




    XIAOHUA HUANG, Plaintiff, v. HUAWEI TECHNOLOGIES CO. LTD., et al., Defendants.

    United States District Court, E.D. Texas, Marshall Division.
    March 18, 2019.

    Editors Note
    Applicable Law: 35 U.S.C. § 271
    Cause: 35 U.S.C. § 271 Patent Infringement
    Nature of Suit: 830 Patent

    Source: PACER




    Attorney(s) appearing for the CaseXiaohua Huang, an Individual, Plaintiff, pro se.
    Huawei Technologies Co. Ltd., Defendant, represented by Edgar Leon Carter, Carter Arnett PLLC, Brooks W. Taylor, Carter Scholer Arnett Hamada & Mockler PLLC, John Steven Torkelson, Carter Arnett PLLC, Scott Wayne Breedlove, Carter Arnett PLLC & Steven Mark Geiszler, Futurewei Technologies, Inc.




    ORDER
    RODNEY GILSTRAP, District Judge.
    The above entitled and numbered civil action was referred to United States Magistrate Judge Roy S. Payne pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636. Now before the Court are (1) pro se Plaintiff Xiaohua Huang's Objections (Dkt. No. 74) to Magistrate Judge Payne's Order (Dkt. No. 64) denying Huang's motion to transfer and (2) Huang's Objections (Dkt. No. 76) to Magistrate Judge Payne's Order and Report and Recommendation (Dkt. No. 65) denying his motion to compel and recommending that Defendant Huawei's motion for summary judgment be granted under the res judicata doctrine.
    Huang contends that this case should be transferred to the Northern District of California because this Court, Magistrate Judge Payne, and the Federal Circuit panel all engaged in fraud in Huang's earlier filed case, Huang v. Huawei Techs. Co., 2:15-cv-1413-JRG-RSP (E.D. Tex. Aug. 14, 2015) (the "earlier filed case"). (Dkt. No. 74). Huang further argues that the grant of summary judgment in the earlier filed case was based on "perjury" committed by Huawei and "fraud" committed by Magistrate Judge Payne. (Dkt. No. 76). Because of such fraud, Huang contends, the summary judgment rendered in the earlier filed was not rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction, rendering the application of the res judicata improper. Id. Huang also agues that the seventy accused products in the present case are different in name, model, and function from the seven products alleged in the earlier filed case, indicating that the same cause of action was not involved in the earlier filed case and the case at hand. Id.
    The Court has considered the objections raised by Huang and finds them to be without merit. All of the arguments raised in the objections were properly considered by the Magistrate Judge. After de novo review, this Court finds no error in the Order (Dkt. No. 64) denying Plaintiff's request to transfer this case or the Order and Report and Recommendation (Dkt. No. 65) recommending that Huawei's summary judgment motion be granted.
    Accordingly, Huang's Objections (Dkt. Nos. 74 and 75) are OVERRULED, the Order and Report and Recommendation (Dkt. No. 65) is hereby ADOPTED, and Huawei's motion for summary judgment (Dkt. No. 40) is GRANTED in all respects. All pending motions in this matter, with the exception of Huawei's motion for sanctions (Dkt. No. 71), are hereby DENIED.
    So ORDERED.





    2019/10/12 11:52 [来自北京市]

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  • 第4楼
    本帖最后由 siceng 于 2019-10-12 12:04 编辑

    2015年的case 1
    HUANG v. HUAWEI TECHNOLOGIES CO., LTD.
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    Case No. 2:15-CV-01413-JRG-RSP.




    XIAOHUA HUANG, Plaintiff, v. HUAWEI TECHNOLOGIES CO., LTD., Defendant.

    United States District Court, E.D. Texas, Marshall Division.
    December 7, 2016.

    Editors Note
    Applicable Law: 35 U.S.C. § 271
    Cause: 35 U.S.C. § 271 Patent Infringement
    Nature of Suit: 830 Patent

    Source: PACER




    Attorney(s) appearing for the CaseRobert W. Faulkner, Mediator, Pro Se.
    Xiaohua Huang, Plaintiff, Pro Se.
    Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd., Defendant, represented by Brooks W. Taylor, Carter Scholer Arnett Hamada & Mockler PLLC, Edgar Leon Carter, Carter Scholer Arnett Hamada & Mockler PLLC, John Steven Torkelson, Carter Scholer Arnett Hamada & Mockler PLLC & K.D. Shull, Huawei Technologies USA Inc.
    Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd., Counter Claimant, represented by Brooks W. Taylor, Carter Scholer Arnett Hamada & Mockler PLLC, Edgar Leon Carter, Carter Scholer Arnett Hamada & Mockler PLLC, John Steven Torkelson, Carter Scholer Arnett Hamada & Mockler PLLC & K.D. Shull, Huawei Technologies USA Inc.




    ORDER
    RODNEY GILSTRAP, District Judge.
    Before the Court is the Report and Recommendation filed by Magistrate Judge Payne on November 22, 2016. (Dkt. 134) recommending that Defendant Huawei's Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. 105) be granted. Having considered the Objections filed by Plaintiff Xiaohua Huang (Dkt. 144) and finding them to be without sufficient merit, the Recommendation is adopted.
    IT IS ORDERED that the Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. 105) is GRANTED. Plaintiff's claims are hereby DISMISSED.
    So ORDERED.





    2019/10/12 12:02 [来自北京市]

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  • 第5楼
    2015年的case 1

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    HUANG v. HUAWEI TECHNOLOGIES CO., LTD.

    Case No. 2:15-CV-01413-JRG-RSP



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    • Cited Cases


    XIAOHUA HUANG, pro se, Plaintiff, v. HUAWEI TECHNOLOGIES CO., LTD., Defendant.

    United States District Court, E.D. Texas, Marshall Division.
    March 27, 2017.

    Editors Note
    Applicable Law: 35 U.S.C. § 271
    Cause: 35 U.S.C. § 271 Patent Infringement
    Nature of Suit: 830 Patent

    Source: PACER





    Attorney(s) appearing for the Case
    Robert W. Faulkner, Mediator, Pro Se.
    Xiaohua Huang, Plaintiff, Pro Se.
    Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd., Defendant, represented by Brooks W. Taylor , Carter Scholer Arnett Hamada & Mockler PLLC, Edgar Leon Carter , Carter Scholer Arnett Hamada & Mockler PLLC, John Steven Torkelson , Carter Scholer Arnett Hamada & Mockler PLLC, K.D. Shull , Huawei Technologies USA Inc &Scott Wayne Breedlove , Carter Scholer Arnett Mockler.
    Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd., Counter Claimant, represented by Brooks W. Taylor , Carter Scholer Arnett Hamada & Mockler PLLC, Edgar Leon Carter , Carter Scholer Arnett Hamada & Mockler PLLC, John Steven Torkelson , Carter Scholer Arnett Hamada & Mockler PLLC & K.D. Shull , Huawei Technologies USA Inc.









    MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
    ROY S. PAYNE, District Judge.
    Mr. Xiaohua Huang, acting pro se, sued Huawei Technologies Co., LTD. (Huawei) for infringement of U.S. Patent Nos. 6,744,653, 6,999,331, and RE45,259, which are generally related to circuits for content addressable memory (CAM). After the Court granted summary judgment of noninfringement and entered final judgment, Huawei moved for attorneys' fees under 35 U.S.C. § 285 and under the Court's inherent power. See Huawei Br., ECF No. 179. For the following reasons, Huawei's motion is GRANTED.





    BACKGROUND
    Mr. Huang owns CMOS Micro Device, Inc. (CMOS), a company headquartered in Silicon Valley. Compl. ? 2, ECF No. 1. According to the complaint, CMOS develops and markets CAM technology. Id. The patents-in-suit all relate to CAM circuits and name Mr. Huang as the sole inventor. See ECF No. 1-1. The Complaint alleges that Huawei sells products known as "switches" that include chips covered by the patents-in-suit. Compl. ? 3, ECF No. 1.
    Huawei initially responded to the lawsuit by emailing Mr. Huang to request an extension of time to answer the complaint. Li Pengyan Decl. ? 3, Jan. 26, 2017, ECF No. 179-1. A few days later, Mr. Huang called Huawei's offices in China and indicated that resolution of the lawsuit was not his goal. Id. ? 4. Rather, Mr. Huang asked for an offer from Huawei to purchase the patents-in-suit. Id.Huawei told Mr. Huang that it was not interested. Id. ? 5.
    Early motion practice followed. Mr. Huang's original complaint was filed both on behalf of Mr. Huang personally and CMOS, Mr. Huang's company. See Compl., ECF No. 1. But because Mr. Huang is not licensed to practice law, Huawei filed a motion to compel CMOS to obtain legal counsel given the long-standing rule precluding a corporation from proceeding pro se in federal court. See Rowland v. Calif. Men's Colony, 506 U.S. 194, 201-02 (1993); Huawei Mot. 2-3, ECF No. 8. Mr. Huang thereafter filed an amended complaint on behalf of only himself. See Am. Compl., ECF No. 12. Huawei filed additional motions to dismiss, all of which were ultimately rendered moot by Mr. Huang's third amended complaint. See Order dated Sept. 21, 2016, ECF No. 103.
    About six months into discovery, Huawei sent Mr. Huang a Rule 11 safe harbor letter explaining that Mr. Huang's infringement allegations were baseless. SeeHuawei Rule 11 Br. 2, ECF No. 52. Discovery had revealed that Huawei has never imported into the United States or sold a router or switch containing the particular type of chip that formed the basis of Mr. Huang's claim. Id. This Rule 11 motion (in addition to numerous motions filed by Mr. Huang to compel discovery) prompted the Court to set a hearing on July 27, 2016.
    It became clear during the July hearing that Mr. Huang would not likely establish a basis for infringement because Mr. Huang could not access necessary technical details concerning Huawei's products. See Hr'g Tr. 3-13, Jul. 27, 2016, ECF No. 183. Huawei had properly designated this technical information "confidential" and "attorneys' eyes only" under the (agreed) protective order. See id. The protective order precludes Mr. Huang from personally viewing such information because Mr. Huang designs and markets his own CAM technology to Huawei's competitors in China. See, e.g., Huawei Resp. Br. 1-2, ECF No. 117. Mr. Huang would also likely be prevented from viewing related third-party product information that would be necessary to support Mr. Huang's infringement contentions. See Hr'g Tr. 3-13, ECF No. 183.
    The Court explained to Mr. Huang that his pro se status would likely impair if not prevent a successful opposition to summary judgment. Id. Mr. Huang expressed a contrary view. When the Court asked Mr. Huang if he had "any ideas to offer about how to get around the problem of sharing confidential information with your side of the case without an outside lawyer," Mr. Huang responded, "In fact, I do not need to see any so-called confidential information from Huawei." Id.13:19-14:9. According to Mr. Huang, a contract between Huawei and a supply company and various Huawei chip model numbers would be enough. Id. 14:1-9. The Court sought clarification: "And you're saying that you believe that you can prove your case with just the model number of the chip and a copy of the contract between Huawei and [the supply company]?" Id. 16:7-10. "Yes, your Honor, that's enough." Id. 16:11. Mr. Huang intended to reverse engineer the accused chips, an endeavor that Mr. Huang acknowledged would be very costly. Id. 20:1-22.
    The Court took Mr. Huang's representations that he did not require confidential information with caution and stayed the case for 60 days to allow Mr. Huang time to find legal counsel, while deferring Huawei's Rule 11 motion. Id. 26:9-13. Mr. Huang never attempted to hire counsel as far as the record reflects. Rather, Mr. Huang proceeded undeterred. Only about two weeks after the July hearing—while the case was stayed—Mr. Huang began filing numerous motions to compel Huawei to produce the very type of information the Court had determined to be properly designated as "attorneys' eyes only." See ECF Nos. 94, 95, 96. Mr. Huang's discovery motions were denied without prejudice in light of the stay, seeECF No. 99, prompting Mr. Huang to appeal that denial to the district judge, seeECF No. 100. The appeal was unsuccessful. See ECF No. 101. Still undeterred, Mr. Huang filed another civil action based on the same asserted patents along with a motion to consolidate the newly-filed case with the stayed case. See ECF No. 104; Compl. in Case No. 2:16-cv-947, Aug. 26, 2016, ECF No. 1.
    At the conclusion of the 60-day stay, Mr. Huang had not obtained counsel, and Huawei moved for summary judgment. ECF No. 105. The Court recommended granting summary judgment upon finding no evidence to support Mr. Huang's infringement claims. ECF No. 134. After considering Mr. Huang's objections to that recommendation, the District Judge granted summary judgment and dismissed Mr. Huang's case. ECF No. 146. Mr. Huang continued to object to the Court's dismissal Order, ECF No. 148, 163, and eventually filed a notice of appeal to the Federal Circuit on January 19, 2017, ECF No. 173.
    A declaration submitted by Huawei's in house counsel provides a possible explanation for Mr. Huang's persistent litigation conduct. Li Pengyan Decl., ECF No. 179-1. Despite having been asked to only communicate with Huawei through their outside counsel, Mr. Huang has been in constant contact with Huawei's in house counsel throughout the case. Id. ? 7. Mr. Huang told Huawei's counsel that he sued Huawei because one of his (lawyer) friends told him that if he were to represent Mr. Huang in a lawsuit against Hauwei, the case would quickly settle for $1.5 million. Id. Mr. Huang said that he nevertheless decided not to hire an attorney because he did not want to share revenue with a lawyer. Id. Even after the Court granted Huawei's motion for summary judgment and dismissed the case, Mr. Huang told Huawei's in house counsel that he would continue filing motions—forcing Huawei to reply and incur further legal fees. Id.
    Among the barrage of documents filed by Mr. Huang are motions and other papers suggesting that Huawei's corporate representatives and Huawei's counsel have not been truthful and that Huawei has engaged in improper behavior. See, e.g., Huang Mot. for Perjury Charges, Jan. 18, 2017, ECF No. 170. As early as the July hearing, Mr. Huang began characterizing Huawei's declarations as "not truthful." Hr'g Tr. 24:21-23, ECF No. 183. Indeed, Mr. Huang's response to Huawei's Rule 11 motion was that "it is completely baseless; and I'm going to file a motion for Rule 11 to sanction Huawei's improper [conduct]." Id. 23:14-16. Mr. Huang's allegations of untruthfulne****ulminated with a "motion for perjury charges" filed on January 18, 2017. ECF No. 170.
    Huawei thereafter filed their motion for attorneys' fees. See Huawei Br., ECF No. 179. In part because Mr. Huang continues to represent himself, the Court scheduled a hearing to determine whether Mr. Huang could explain his conduct, why he had chosen not to hire an attorney, and why the Court should not award fees and costs. Mr. Huang appeared at the hearing but offered no satisfactory explanation for his litigation conduct. In fact, Mr. Huang continued to maintain that Huawei's witnesses and lawyers were being untruthful, and that they were committing perjury. In response to these accusations, one of Huawei's attorneys explained that he had personally considered filing a libel or slander suit against Mr. Huang given Mr. Huang's repeated perjury accusations. It is against this abbreviated review of the case that the Court decides Huawei's attorneys' fees motion.





    DISCUSSION
    Section 285 provides that "[t]he court in exceptional cases may award reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing party." 35 U.S.C. § 285. The statute imposes "one and only one constraint on district courts' discretion to award attorney's fees in patent litigation: [t]he power is reserved for `exceptional' cases." Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., 134 S.Ct. 1749, 1755-56 (2014). An "exceptional" case is "one that stands out from others with respect to the substantive strength of a party's litigating position (considering both the governing law and the facts of the case) or the unreasonable manner in which the case was litigated." Id. at 1756. "District courts may determine whether a case is `exceptional' in the case-by-case exercise of their discretion, considering the totality of the circumstances." Id.
    While expert fees are not awardable under § 285, a court is entitled to use its inherent powers to award such fees. Takeda Chem. Indus., Ltd. v. Mylan Labs., Inc., 549 F.3d 1381, 1391 (Fed. Cir. 2008). A prerequisite is a "finding of fraud or abuse of the judicial process." Amsted Indus. Inc. v. Buckeye Steel Castings Co., 23 F.3d 374, 378 (Fed. Cir. 1994). Such a finding may result from a litigant's "bad faith and vexatious litigation conduct." Takeda, 549 F.3d at 1391.
    The Court agrees with Huawei that this case is exceptional under § 285 and reveals bad faith and an abuse of the judicial process. Section 285 was designed to have a remedial effect, to deter unwarranted litigation. Mathis v. Spears, 857 F.2d 749, 754 (Fed. Cir. 1988). This case was unwarranted, to say the least. Mr. Huang submitted no evidence of any meaningful pre-suit investigation, and for the reasons already explained, Mr. Huang was unable to obtain discovery into Huawei's accused products. Huawei Br., ECF No. 179. To be clear, however, Mr. Huang's discovery obstacle and unwillingness to obtain counsel to overcome that obstacle is not the primary basis for the Court's finding of exceptionality and bad faith.
    Despite having no obligation to do so, Huawei appears to have proven to itself and made every effort to demonstrate to Mr. Huang that Huawei affirmatively does not infringe the asserted patents. First, Huawei voluntarily provided Mr. Huang with authenticated engineering schematics that establish that the structure and operation of the accused chip circuitry does not meet a particular limitation of the '653 and '331 patent claims. See Huawei Br. 4, ECF No. 179. Second, Huawei reviewed confidential source code, determined that the code demonstrated noninfringement, and repeatedly told Mr. Huang that if he would hire an attorney, the attorney could see for him or herself. Id. Mr. Huang refused, and as far as the record reveals, ignored Huawei's evidence demonstrating noninfringement.
    Not only did Mr. Huang ignore Huawei'****hematics and representations about the accused products, but Mr. Huang became more aggressive as the case progressed and his case weakened. As late as a few days before the hearing on Huawei's motion for attorneys' fees, Mr. Huang was still filing objections and requests for reconsideration of the Court's Order dismissing his case. See, e.g., ECF No. 195. This was well after Mr. Huang had been warned of the consequences of vexatious ligation behavior. See Huawei Br. 2-3, ECF No. 179. In sum, Mr. Huang's case has unnecessarily burdened Huawei and the Court with what appears to have been a frivolous case from the outset. The Court therefore finds Mr. Huang's case to be exceptional and Mr. Huang's litigation behavior to constitute bad faith and an abuse of the judicial process.
    To support this finding, the declarations submitted by Huawei's in house counsel suggest that Mr. Huang's motive all along was to extract a settlement by whatever means necessary. Indeed, Mr. Huang's motion practice increased while the strength of his case gradually declined, which is consistent with Huawei's sworn statement that Mr. Huang believed and represented to Huawei that if he bombarded Huawei with motions, Huawei's attorneys' fees would continue to rise, and, eventually, Huawei would decide to settle. See, e.g., Li Pengyan Decl., ECF No. 179-1. Mr. Huang's only response to these statements is that they are untruthful, indeed, "perjury," as Mr. Huang characterizes them. There is no basis for that conclusion.
    Finally, Mr. Huang's pro se status does not relieve him from liability for attorneys' fees and costs. The Court provided Mr. Huang ample opportunity to seek legal counsel, and there is no indication that this invitation was seriously considered. Moreover, Huawei repeatedly warned Mr. Huang about the consequences of frivolous litigation behavior. Although Mr. Huang is not an attorney, he is a sophisticated pro se litigant, an engineer, and a business owner. Courts have found pro se plaintiffs such as Mr. Huang liable for attorneys' fees simply because their patent infringement actions had no evidentiary basis. See Yufa v. TSI Inc., No. 09-CV-01315-KAW, 2014 WL 4071902, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 14, 2014); Comora v. Thermo Cardiosystems, Inc., No. CV 91-5620 WMB, 1992 WL 315226, at *4 (C.D. Cal. May 5, 1992). That is the least that can be said about this case. The Court therefore finds the case exceptional under § 285 and worthy of additional costs under the Court's inherent powers.





    CONCLUSION
    In light of the foregoing, Huawei's motion for attorneys' fees and costs, ECF No. 179, is GRANTED. Huawei is ORDERED, within seven days of this Order, to submit a revised motion detailing the attorneys' fees and costs that it seeks, separately identifying the fees and costs awardable under § 285 and costs awardable under the Court's inherent powers, as well as the dates those fees and costs were incurred. Mr. Huang is given fourteen days to respond to Huawei's revised motion, after which the Court will determine the appropriate amount of the award.










    2019/10/12 12:06 [来自北京市]

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  • 第6楼
    美国联邦巡回上诉法院,2018年


    HUANG v. HUAWEI TECHNOLOGIES CO., LTD.
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    Nos. 2017-1505, 2017-1767, 2017-1893, 2017-2092, 2017-2229.




    XIAOHUA HUANG, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. HUAWEI TECHNOLOGIES CO., LTD., Defendant-Appellee.

    United States Court of Appeals, Federal Circuit.
    Decided: June 8, 2018.




    Attorney(s) appearing for the CaseXIAOHUA HUANG, Campbell, CA, pro se.
    E. LEON CARTER, Carter Scholer Arnett & Mockler PLLC, Dallas, TX, for defendant-appellee. Also represented by SCOTT W. BREEDLOVE, JOHN STEVEN TORKELSON; GREGORY A. CASTANIAS, DANIEL KAZHDAN, Jones Day, Washington, DC.
    Before REYNA, LINN, and CHEN, Circuit Judges.



    This disposition is nonprecedential.
    PER CURIAM.
    Appellant Xiaohua Huang, proceeding pro se, appeals several rulings from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas, including the district court's grant of summary judgment of noninfringement and grant of attorneys' fees and expert costs. Mr. Huang has filed five separate appeals in this court, all pertaining to the district court action.1 The five appeals have been consolidated and are addressed below. Because the district court did not err or abuse its discretion in granting summary judgment, granting attorneys' fees and costs, and in other rulings challenged by Mr. Huang, we affirm.
    BACKGROUNDI. Initiation of the Lawsuit
    Mr. Huang is the owner of U.S. Patent Nos. 6,744,653, 6,999,331, and RE45259 (collectively, the "Huang patents"). The Huang patents relate to ternary content addressable memory ("TCAM") technology in the field of semiconductor chips. TCAM is a type of computer memory used in search applications that can achieve high-speed routing and switching in networking devices.
    On August 14, 2015, Mr. Huang filed the original complaint on behalf of himself and his company, CMOS Micro Device Inc. ("CMOS"), which develops TCAM technology. The complaint alleged that Huawei Technologies Inc. ("Huawei") infringed the Huang patents by making and selling "switches." SAppx29. Huawei filed a motion to compel CMOS to obtain counsel on the grounds that a corporation may not proceed pro se. In response, Mr. Huang amended his complaint to drop CMOS from the lawsuit.
    Early in the case, the parties jointly moved for entry of an agreed protective order. The protective order provided that certain types of confidential information designated as "attorneys' eyes only" would be subject to disclosure only to counsel, including outside counsel and "in-house counsel with no competitive decision-making authority." SAppx59-62. The protective order also limited disclosure of information designated as confidential source code to "outside counsel and up to three (3) outside consultants or experts." Id.
    On December 1, 2015, Mr. Huang served his infringement contentions pursuant to local patent rules, accusing seven Huawei switches and routers of infringement on the basis that they contained certain third-party chips that allegedly infringed the Huang patents. On January 20, 2016, Mr. Huang filed a third amended complaint following additional early motion practice. The amended complaint also included contentions that Huawei products infringed on the basis of products from third-party suppliers.
    II. Discovery and Rule 11 Motions
    After serving invalidity contentions, Huawei served a Rule 11 safe-harbor letter2on Mr. Huang on March 22, 2016. The letter asserted that Mr. Huang's claims were baseless and that a pre-suit investigation would have revealed that some of the accused products were never sold in the United States. Huawei also made various documents available, including documents from thirdparty suppliers designated as attorneys' eyes only pursuant to the protective order. Huawei contended that the documents showed that the accused products did not infringe the Huang patents and requested that Mr. Huang hire an attorney who could have access to the designated information to evaluate Huawei's contentions. Mr. Huang refused Huawei's request, and on May 23, 2016, Huawei filed a Rule 11 motion.
    A few days later, Mr. Huang filed motions to amend the complaint and his infringement contentions in order to add seventy-four additional Huawei products. All of the additional products were listed on Huawei's public website on December 1, 2015, when Mr. Huang initially served his infringement contentions.
    On July 8, 2017, Mr. Huang filed the first of several motions to compel access to information designated as attorneys' eyes only and confidential source code. Mr. Huang took no depositions and served no interrogatories during discovery.
    III. The July 2016 Hearing and Stay of the Case
    In lieu of a planned Markman hearing, the magistrate judge set a hearing for July 27, 2016, on several pending motions, including Mr. Huang's first motion to compel, his motions to amend the infringement contentions and the third amended complaint, and Huawei's Rule 11 motion. The court denied Mr. Huang's motion to compel the designated confidential information on the basis that Mr. Huang was prohibited from personally gaining access to it under the terms of the protective order. The court denied the motion without prejudice, instructing Mr. Huang that he could re-file it after retaining counsel who could seek access to the designated information. The court also denied Mr. Huang's motions to amend the infringement contentions and the complaint for lack of good cause.
    At the hearing, the court explained the difficulties Mr. Huang would face in satisfying the burden of proof in his case without access to designated confidential information and encouraged him to obtain counsel. Mr. Huang represented that he had tried to retain counsel and would continue to do so. Mr. Huang also asserted that he could prove his case without personally gaining access to the confidential information by hiring a third party to reverse engineer the accused chips, a process that he acknowledged would cost hundreds of thousands of dollars. SAppx1066-75. Despite Mr. Huang's assertion that he did not need access to confidential information, the court stayed the case for sixty days to allow Mr. Huang time to seek assistance of counsel and deferred ruling on Huawei's Rule 11 motion.
    About two weeks after the July hearing, during the stay, Mr. Huang filed the first of several more motions to compel the same type of designated confidential information he previously sought. Mr. Huang also filed additional motions to amend the complaint and to amend infringement contentions—the same motions denied by the court at the July hearing. The court denied all of Mr. Huang's renewed motions without prejudice in light of the stay.
    At this point, Mr. Huang filed a separate patent infringement suit, alleging infringement of the Huang patents by the same seventy-four Huawei products he attempted to add to his first case. Mr. Huang then filed a motion to consolidate the two cases.
    IV. Summary Judgment
    On September 29, 2016, Huawei moved for summary judgment of noninfringement as to all three Huang patents. Huawei asserted that summary judgment was warranted for lack of infringement evidence and because its own evidence established noninfringement. In response to Huawei's motion, Mr. Huang submitted exhibits of purported reverse-engineering images and drawings, including hand-drawn figures, that he had not produced in discovery. His exhibits also included declarations from previously undisclosed witnesses. Huawei moved to strike several of Mr. Huang's exhibits on various grounds, including failure to produce or disclose them during discovery.
    On November 22, 2016, the magistrate judge issued a combined order and report and recommendation on summary judgment and several other motions. The magistrate judge recommended granting summary judgment, finding that Mr. Huang had not raised a triable issue of fact, and noted that Mr. Huang chose not to hire an attorney that would have been able to access protective order information on the Huawei products. The magistrate judge granted Huawei's motion to strike on the basis that Mr. Huang failed to produce or disclose during discovery the exhibits that he submitted with his response.
    In the same order, the court denied third and fourth motions to compel filed by Mr. Huang. Mr. Huang had recently retained experts and asserted that they should have access to the designated information he sought in his prior motions to compel. The court reasoned that providing the experts with the designated information would be of no use to Mr. Huang, referring to the reasons explained at the July hearing. Four days after the magistrate judge's order, Mr. Huang filed a fifth motion to compel similar information, which the court denied.
    On December 7, 2016, the district judge adopted the magistrate judge's November 22 order and report and recommendation, overruling objections filed by Mr. Huang. The next day, Mr. Huang filed a second challenge to the magistrate judge's ruling, which the district judge again denied while confirming that Mr. Huang's claims were dismissed.
    V. Attorneys' Fees and Costs
    On January 31, 2017, Huawei moved for fees and expert costs under 35 U.S.C. § 285 and the court's inherent power. In support, Huawei submitted declarations stating that Mr. Huang repeatedly contacted Huawei's inhouse counsel about settlement, despite Huawei's outside counsel's repeated instructions to Mr. Huang not to do so. The declarations asserted that Mr. Huang had stated that he sued Huawei because he believed the case would quickly settle for $1.5 million, that he did not want to share revenue with a lawyer, and that he would continue filing motions to force Huawei to incur legal fees. Huawei's fees motion also pointed to Mr. Huang's allegations that Huawei, its attorneys, and its third-party declarants had purportedly made perjured statements in Huawei's summary judgment declarations.3 Mr. Huang responded by making additional unsupported perjury allegations.
    After a hearing, the magistrate judge granted Huawei's fees motion, finding that the case was exceptional under § 285 and worthy of granting expert costs under the court's inherent power. The court found that Mr. Huang "offered no satisfactory explanation for his litigation conduct," which the court determined was in bad faith and an abuse of the judicial process. Xiaohua Huang v. Huawei Techs. Co., No. 2:15-CV-1413, 2017 WL 1133201, at *3-4 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 27, 2017). The court found that Mr. Huang's motion practice corroborated the statements about Mr. Huang's litigation motives in Huawei's declarations in support of its fees motion. The court noted it had given Mr. Huang ample opportunity to retain assistance of counsel and that Mr. Huang's pro se status did not relieve him from the consequences of frivolous litigation conduct. On these grounds, the court awarded attorneys' fees and costs to Huawei.
    In quantifying the fees and costs awarded, the magistrate judge limited the amount to those incurred from the date of Huawei's Rule 11 safe-harbor letter to the grant of summary judgment on December 7, 2016. The court awarded a total of $604,036.71.4
    This court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1).
    DISCUSSIONI. Summary Judgment
    Huawei moved for summary judgment of noninfringement on the basis that Mr. Huang presented no evidence showing the structure or operation of the accused Huawei products to support his allegations of infringement. Huawei also contended that it presented affirmative evidence of noninfringement through its own documents and declarations from Huawei employees and a technical expert. The district court granted Huawei's motion for summary judgment and dismissed Mr. Huang's claims. Mr. Huang argues that the district court erred because he presented evidence of infringement through several exhibits attached to his opposition to Huawei's summary judgment motion. We agree with the district court.
    We review a grant of summary judgment under the law of the regional circuit, in this case, the Fifth Circuit. See Travel Sentry, Inc. v. Tropp, 877 F.3d 1370, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2017). The Fifth Circuit reviews a grant of summary judgment de novo. Triple Tee Golf, Inc. v. Nike, Inc., 485 F.3d 253, 261 (5th Cir. 2007). On appeal from a grant of summary judgment of noninfringement, we determine whether no reasonable jury could find infringement after resolving reasonable factual inferences in favor of the patentee. IMS Tech., Inc. v. Haas Automation, Inc., 206 F.3d 1422, 1429 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
    Mr. Huang failed to produce any evidence showing the structure or operation of Huawei's accused products or how the limitations of the claims of the Huang patents were met by such accused products. Without Mr. Huang having access to information on the accused Huawei products, he could not show how they purportedly infringed the Huang patents. Moreover, Huawei presented unrebutted evidence of noninfringement. Even considering the evidence in the light most favorable to Mr. Huang, it does not establish a genuine dispute of material fact such that a reasonable jury could find infringement. See Appx13, 20-21. Accordingly, we affirm the district court's grant of summary judgment of noninfringement.
    Mr. Huang also challenges the district court's decision to grant Huawei's motion to strike several exhibits attached to his response in opposition to Huawei's motion for summary judgment, including purported reverseengineering records. Mr. Huang contends that because he filed his opposition with the attached exhibits on the last day of discovery, the district court erred in granting Huawei's motion to strike. Huawei responds that the district court properly struck Mr. Huang's exhibits because they consisted of declarations from previously undisclosed witnesses and were based on purported reverse-engineering records that were never produced, in violation of Mr. Huang's discovery obligations.
    "A district court's rulings regarding evidence it will consider in decidin******tion for summary judgment are reviewed for abuse of discretion." Tex. E. Transmission Corp. v. Amerada Hess Corp., 145 F.3d 737, 741 (5th Cir. 1998); see also United States v. Phillips, 219 F.3d 404, 409 (5th Cir. 2000) ("We review the district court's admission of evidence for an abuse of discretion."). We agree that Mr. Huang's failure to meet his discovery obligations by not producing information5 central to his case provides a sufficient basis for striking Mr. Huang's exhibits. Thus, the district court did not abuse its discretion in granting Huawei's motion to strike.
    II. Attorneys' Fees and Costs
    The district court found that this was an exceptional case and granted attorneys' fees to Huawei under § 285. We agree. An "exceptional" case "stands out from others with respect to the substantive strength of a party's litigating position (considering both the governing law and the facts of the case) or the unreasonable manner in which the case was litigated." Highmark Inc. v. Allcare Health Mgmt. Sys., Inc., 134 S.Ct. 1744, 1748 (2014). "[T]he exceptional-case determination is to be reviewed only for abuse of discretion." Id. We give deference to the district court as it "is better positioned to decide whether a case is exceptional . . . because it lives with the case over a prolonged period of time." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
    The record reflects that Mr. Huang presented no evidence to support his litigation position and that Mr. Huang litigated the case in a frivolous manner. Mr. Huang submitted no evidence of pre-suit investigation and no evidence of infringement. Huawei submitted evidence that Mr. Huang's intent from the outset of the litigation was to force Huawei to incur legal fees in hopes that it would quickly settle. Mr. Huang did not attempt to refute this evidence except with baseless allegations of perjury against Huawei's declarants and counsel. Further, Mr. Huang's accelerating motion practice as the case progressed, including filing repetitive and nearly identical motions, was unreasonable litigation conduct and consistent with the declarations submitted by Huawei in support of its fees motion.
    As the district court observed, pro se plaintiffs have been held liable for attorneys' fees simply because their patent infringement actions had no evidentiary basis, even without similar litigation misconduct as in this case. See, e.g., Yufa v. TSI Inc., No. 09-CV-1315, 2014 WL 4071902, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 14, 2014); Comora v. Thermo Cardiosystems, Inc., No. 91-CV-5620, 1992 WL 315226, at *4 (C.D. Cal. May 5, 1992). Accordingly, we affirm the district court's award of attorneys' fees under § 285.
    The district court also granted expert costs under its inherent power. Several times, the district court found that Mr. Huang's litigation behavior constituted bad faith and an abuse of the judicial process. Appx6, 14. We review the district court's grant of sanctions under its inherent power de novo. F.D.I.C. v. Maxxam, Inc., 523 F.3d 566, 590 (5th Cir. 2008). Upon review of the record, we agree with the findings of the district court. Accordingly, the district court did not err in invoking its inherent authority to award expert costs.
    CONCLUSION
    Mr. Huang challenges several other rulings made by the district court. We have reviewed Mr. Huang's remaining arguments and consider them to be without merit. For the foregoing reasons, the court affirms the district court's grant of summary judgment of noninfringement, grant of attorneys' fees and expert costs, and the other district court rulings challenged by Mr. Huang.
    AFFIRMED
    COSTS
    Costs to Appellee.
    FootNotes
    1. Mr. Huang filed a first appeal (2017-1505) after summary judgment of noninfringement. Mr. Huang filed a second appeal (2017-1767), challenging the district court's decision to award unquantified fees and several of the underlying orders. Mr. Huang's third appeal (2017-1893) concerns the district court's quantified fee award and several of the same underlying orders. Mr. Huang's fourth (2017-2092) and fifth (2017-2229) appeals are largely duplicative of the first three appeals.
    2. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, Huawei's letter attached its intended motion for Rule 11 sanctions and gave Mr. Huang notice of Huawei's intent to move at least twenty-one days in advance of filing.
    3. Mr. Huang's unsupported perjury allegations began after dismissal of his claims and Huawei's rejection of a five-figure settlement offer, and included filin******tion requesting that Huawei's declarants be criminally prosecuted.
    4. Mr. Huang objected to the magistrate judge's decision by making additional accusations of perjury and characterizing the magistrate judge's ruling as "deliberately an abuse of discretion." Appx6. In overruling the objections, the district judge warned that he "may issue further sanctions for [Mr. Huang's] flagrant abuse of the judicial process" and unsupported allegations against Huawei and the magistrate judge. SAppx24.
    5. The record indicates that Mr. Huang withheld this information from Huawei, despite its repeated requests to produce it. While Mr. Huang claims that he provided the information at issue with his summary judgment opposition on the last day of discovery, the record shows that he relied on declarations from witnesses who had never been previously disclosed. See e.g., SAppx755, 883-85. Moreover, the record indicates that he never produced the raw data underlying several exhibits to his summary judgment opposition. See SAppx884. Mr. Huang's amended initial and additional disclosures, filed after the close of discovery, indicated that he had information "ready to be released to Defendant upon [sic] the Defendant provides the information which Plaintiff required [sic]" and listed the same types of confidential information subject to his motions to compel that he requested from Huawei. SAppx 776.







    2019/10/12 12:11 [来自北京市]

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