爱丽丝公司的“梦游幻境”
发布时间：2013.05.22 北京市查看：6116 评论：0
本帖最后由 hhtabm 于 2013-5-22 16:53 编辑
The Alice in Wonderland En Banc Decision by the Federal Circuit in CLS Bank v. Alice Corp
After the Federal Circuit issued its en banc decision on May 10, 2013 in CLS Bank v. Alice Corp, the patent owner Alice Corp must be feeling like Alice in Alice in Wonderland, bewildered and frightened by the fantastical situation in which they find themselves:
在美国联邦巡回法庭在2013年5月10日对CLS Bank和爱丽丝公司之间的诉讼案通过en banc程序审理并作出决定后，相关专利的所有者爱丽丝公司就像《爱丽丝梦游记》中的爱丽丝一样，对自己的处境感到困惑，对不确定的前途感到恐惧：
(1)“bewildered” because an equally divided Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s holding that Alice’s claimed system to tangible machine components including a first party device, a data storage unit, a second party device, a computer, and a communications controller, programmed with specialized functions consistent with detailed algorithms disclosed in the patent, constitutes a patent ineligible “abstract idea;”
困惑是因为联邦巡回法庭认可了地方法院对Alice的有型元件组系统的权利要求的判决，该系统包括：第一部分设备，一个数据存储单元，一个第二部分设备，一台电脑和一个通信控制器，利用特殊的函数来编程，程序采用专利中公开的具体算法，地方法院认为该专利因为包含“抽象概念”而认定该专利无效。
(2) “frightened” because, as Judge Moore puts it, “this case is the death of hundreds of thousands of patents, including all business method, financial system, and software patents as well as many computer implemented and telecommunications patents” (Moore Op. at 2); and
“恐惧”是因为，如摩尔法官所说“这个案例敲响了众多专利的丧钟，包括所有的商业方法专利，金融专利，和软件专利以及众多的利用电脑实施的专利以及通信专利。
(3)“fantastical” because, as Judge Newman puts it, the en banc court was tasked to provide objective standards for 35 USC §101 patent-eligibility, but instead has “propounded at least three incompatible standards, devoid of consensus, serving to add to the unreliability and cost of the [patent] system…[such that] the only assurance is that any successful innovation is likely to be challenged in opportunistic litigation, whose result will depend on the random selection of the panel” (Newman Op. at 1-2).
“不确定”是因为，如纽曼法官所说，en banc法庭的任务是利用美国法律客观的评价专利的有效性，但是法庭却“提出了至少三个自相矛盾的标准，没有提出一致的标准。唯一可以确定的是任何成功的创新都可能会被投机取巧的诉讼所破坏，而最终的结果只取决于合议组人员的选择。”
What panel would that be? A panel including at least any two of Judges Lourie, Dyk, Prost, Reyna, and Wallach would be the favorites for an accused infringer hoping to sink any asserted business method, financial system, and software patent through a §101 “abstract idea” attack. A panel including at least any two of Judges Rader, Linn, Moore, O’Malley and Newman would be the favorites for an owner of a business method, financial system, and software patent hoping to survive a §101 “abstract idea” attack.
选择什么样的合议组呢？一个包括Lourie, Dyk, Prost, Reyna, 和Wallach中至少两人的合议组会做出支持那些侵权者的决定，依据“抽象概念”将商业方法、金融系统和软件专利无效的决定。一个包括Rader, Linn, Moore, O’Malley 和Newman 中的至少两人的合议组会在商业方法专利、金融系统专利和软件专利被以“抽象概念”提出无效请求时做出支持这些专利所有者的决定。
All the Judges rely on the same Supreme Court precedents in Gottschalk v Benson, Parker v. Flook, Diamond v. Diehr, Bilski v. Kappos, and Mayo v. Prometheus. All the Judges recognize the same judicial exception to statutory subject matter under §101 for laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas. All the Judges recognize that a claim must include “meaningful limitations” that go beyond an abstract idea. Hollow field-of-use limitations and insignificant pre or post-solution activity don’t count. However, this is where their similarities end.
所有的法官都参照了Gottschalk v Benson, Parker v. Flook, Diamond v. Diehr, Bilski v. Kappos, 和Mayo v. Prometheus等判例。所有的法官都认可专利法第101条的规定，自然原理，自然现象和抽象概念不能授予专利。所有的法官都认定只有在“抽象概念”上加上“有意义的限制”才能授予其专利权。不准确的应用领域的限制或无实际意义的预先或后续处理措施不是“有意义的限制”。但法官们的共识仅限于此。
For Judge Lourie and four other Judges who joined his opinion, the Supreme Court guidance for §101 analysis turns on whether there is claim “preemption.” Lourie Op. at 9. A claim cannot subsume the full scope of a fundamental concept/abstract idea, and when that threat exists, the court must look for meaningful limitations that prevent the claim as a whole from covering the concept’s every practical application. Lourie Op. at 16. The starting point for analyzing whether a claim preempts an abstract idea is to unambiguously identify that “abstract idea” represented in the claim. Lourie Op. at 18 and 25.
Lourie等持相同意见的五名法官将最高法院对专利法101条的解释理解为判断一项权利要求是否有效在于该权利要求“是否有概括性”。一项权利要求不能包含全局的基本概念和抽象概念，当包含全局概念或抽象概念时，法庭必须寻找一项有效的限制来防止权利要求的范围扩展到观念的所有实施例中。判断一项权利要求是否概括一个“抽象概念”的判断标准是是否能够明确地确定“抽象概念”体现在权利要求中。
This is a great starting point for accused infringers, because carried to its extreme, all inventions are unpatentable because all inventions can be reduced to some abstract idea. This is the same as finding the “gist” or “heart” of the invention, which is improper for the same reasons. Rader Op. at 35. So, it comes as no surprise that Judge Lourie finds the abstract idea to be “reducing settlement risk by effecting trades through a third-party intermediary (here, the supervisory institution) empowered to verify that both parties can fulfill their obligations before allowing the exchange – i.e., a form of escrow.” Lourie Op. at 25. There you have it, Alice is simply claiming a form of escrow. There are no other meaningful limitations that save the method claims and computer readable claims from the abstract idea of an escrow. A total of eight Judges find the method and computer readable medium claims patent ineligible, but for different reasons. Judges Linn and O’Malley take issue with this – which I’ll get back to shortly.
这种判断标准对于那些侵权者很有利，因为在极端情况下，所有的专利都是无效的，因为它们都可以归结到抽象概念上。这就像寻找专利的“主旨”或“核心”。所以，Lourie法官将权利要求中的抽象概念解释为“利用一种第三方媒介通过影响交易双方来降低交易的风险，这种第三方媒介用来确认交易双方在交易之前是否履行了各自的义务，所以，权利要求记载的技术方案就是一种escrow。”就这样，爱丽丝公司的专利成了一种escrow的专利。除了方法权利要求和电脑可读媒介权利要求以外对于escrow这个抽象概念没有任何的有意义的限制。有八名法官认为方法权利要求和电脑可读介质权利要求是无效的，但理由有多种。 Linn 和 O’Malley法官对此持反对立场，这个我们稍后会谈。
这种判断标准对于那些侵权者很有利，因为在极端情况下，所有的专利都是无效的，因为它们都可以归结到抽象概念上。这就像寻找专利的“主旨”或“核心”。所以，Lourie法官将权利要求中的抽象概念解释为“利用一种第三方媒介通过影响交易双方来降低交易的风险，这种第三方媒介用来确认交易双方在交易之前是否履行了各自的义务，所以，权利要求记载的技术方案就是一种escrow。”就这样，爱丽丝公司的专利成了一种escrow的专利。除了方法权利要求和电脑可读媒介权利要求以外对于escrow这个抽象概念没有任何的有意义的限制。有八名法官认为方法权利要求和电脑可读介质权利要求是无效的，但理由有多种。 Linn 和 O’Malley法官对此持反对立场，这个我们稍后会谈。
A major issue is with the system claims. Judge Lourie simply notes that they recite the same features as the patent ineligible method and computer readable claims. Lourie Op. at 33-34. The mere addition of generic computer components encompassing the same functional features as the method claims are tantamount to the clever claims drafting that the Supreme Court instructed the courts to ignore. Id. “Abstract methods do not become patent-eligible machines by being clothed in computer language.” Lourie Op. at 37-38.
一个重要的问题是关于系统权利要求的。Lourie法官仅仅简单地指出这些系统权利要求仅仅叙述了那些不能被授予专利权的方法和计算机媒介的技术特征。一般的电脑器件加上相同结构的技术特征构成的权利要求是最高法院要求法法庭不予认可的权利要求。“抽象概念披上编程语言的外衣并不能成为可以授予专利权的客体”。
However, as Judges Linn and O’Malley put it, “[t]he ‘abstraction’ [Judge Lourie] ferrets from his own reading of the method claims…works much like a computer virus to infect his analysis of all of the claims, regardless of their limitations…[Judge Lourie] actually strips the claims of their detail and limitations – in direct contravention of the Supreme Court’s admonitions…” Linn Op. at 9.
但是，如Judges Linn 和 O’Malley法官所说，“从方法权利要求中理解出的“抽象性”，更像是干扰他对权利要求理解的电脑病毒一样，将权利要求的所有细节和限制剥离，是违反最高法院的规定的。
Judges Rader, Linn, Moore and O’Malley take a completely different approach to the whole §101 analysis. They lay out certain principles that must be followed:
Rader, Linn, Moore 和O’Malley法官对于美国专利法第101条有完全不同的理解。他们认为必须遵循以下原则：
1. First, they remind us that we’re talking about judicial exceptions to a broad §101 statute enacted by Congress. Rader Op. at 5-11. This is important because “one of the principles that must guide our inquiry is that judge-made exceptions to properly enacted statutes are to be narrowlyconstrued.” Rader Op. at 24 (emphasis added). Judge Lourie makes no effort to narrowly construe the judge-made exception for abstract ideas.
1.首先，他们提醒我们，这个案例本质是按照专利法101条的规定，是否是因为爱丽丝公司的专利无效而CLS Bank不需要承担侵权责任。弄清这点非常重要因为“在审判中必须要遵循的一个原则是，法官根据法规作出免责决定的适用范围是非常窄的”。Lourie法官显然没有注意到这一点，将抽象概念的适用范围扩大化了。
2. There is a presumption of validity that applies even to challenges under §101, which can only be overcome by clear and convincing evidence of ineligibility. Rader Op. at 26 (emphasis added). Although Judge Lourie also recognizes a presumption of validity under a §101 challenge (Lourie Op. at 22-23), there is no discussion or finding of any clear and convincing evidence of ineligibility.
1.首先，他们提醒我们，这个案例本质是按照专利法101条的规定，是否是因为爱丽丝公司的专利无效而CLS Bank不需要承担侵权责任。弄清这点非常重要因为“在审判中必须要遵循的一个原则是，法官根据法规作出免责决定的适用范围是非常窄的”。Lourie法官显然没有注意到这一点，将抽象概念的适用范围扩大化了。
2. There is a presumption of validity that applies even to challenges under §101, which can only be overcome by clear and convincing evidence of ineligibility. Rader Op. at 26 (emphasis added). Although Judge Lourie also recognizes a presumption of validity under a §101 challenge (Lourie Op. at 22-23), there is no discussion or finding of any clear and convincing evidence of ineligibility.
2.在以专利法101条对专利提出无效请求时，有效性判定法则依然适用，只有在存在清晰和可信的证据能证明专利无效时，专利的有效性判定才不适用。虽然Lourie法官也认可有效性判定法则，但没有提到是否有清晰可信的证据证明专利是无效的。
3. Don’t start by distilling the “abstract idea,” “gist,” or “heart” of the invention. A claim cannot be stripped down, simplified, generalized, or paraphrased to remove all of its concrete limitations, until at its core, something that could be characterized as an abstract idea is revealed. The claim as a whole must be considered. “A court cannot go hunting for abstractions by ignoring the concrete, palpable, tangible limitations of the invention the patentee actually claims.” Rader Op. at 13.
3.不能提取一项发明的“抽象概念”“主旨”或“核心”。一项专利不能被剥离，简化，概括或演绎，不能去掉它的所有具体的限制，使专利只剩下它的“核心”，即所谓的“抽象概念”。必须考虑一项权利要求的整体性。“法庭不能忽视专利的权利要求中具体，明白，可感知的限制，只关注那些“抽象概念”。
4. Judge Lourie incorrectly dismisses In re Alappat because “the world of technology has changed” and the “Supreme Court has spoken since Alappat on the question of patent eligibility.” Lourie Op. at 37-38. There is no time limit on Alappat. And, patent eligibility is determined as of the patent’s filing date – not whether technology has changed such that technology today would make what’s claimed from the early 1990s patent ineligible. Rader Op. at 20, fn. 4. Claims also do not become abstract simply through passage of time. Moore Op. at 6.
4.Lourie法官错误地否定了In re Alappat 判例的原则，其理由是“世界的科技已经发生了改变”和“最高法院在In re Alappat案后对于专利有效性已经有了新的说明”。但是，对于 Alappat判例的适用没有时间限制。同时，专利的有效性是在申请时决定的——不会因为科技的进步而使专利的有效性发生改变，当今的技术不能使20世纪90年代的专利无效。一项有效的权利要求也不会时间的流逝而变成抽象概念。
Quite the contrary, the principles of Alappat are right on point. The combination of machine and software “creates a new machine, because a general purpose computer in effect becomes a special purpose computer once it is programmed to perform particular functions pursuant to instructions from program software.” Rader Op. at 27. As Judge Lourie would have it, “At its most basic, a computer is just a calculator capable of performing mental steps faster than a human could. Unless the claims require a computer to perform operations that are not merely accelerated calculations, a computer does not itself confer patent eligibility.” Lourie Op. at 27. However, “f a computer can do what a human can in a better, specifically limited way, it could be patent eligible…even an increase in speed alone may be sufficient to result in a meaningful limitation.” Rader Op. at 29, fn.7. All that is required is that the claims tie an otherwise abstract idea to a specific way of doing something with a computer, or a specific computer for doing something. Rader Op. at 21. For instance, an inventor could claim the abstract idea of translating Chinese into English through a combination of circuitry, transistors, capacitors, and other tangible electronic components. Such complex, interrelated machine components would squarely fit within the broad categories of §101, without any concern about claiming an abstract idea. Well, the fact that innovation has allowed these machines to move from vacuum-tube-filled specialized mechanical behemoths, to generalized machines changed bypunch cards, to electronically programmable machines that can fit in the palm of one’s hand, does not render them abstract. Rader Op. at 28-29.
恰恰相反，Alappat 判例在这个案件中适用。机器和软件的结合“创造了一种新的机器，因为当一台电脑在软件的驱动下实现特殊的功能时，这台电脑就从一般用途的电脑变成了特殊用途的电脑。正如 Lourie法官所说：“从根本上说，电脑仅仅是一台能比人类更快地执行智能运算的机器。除非权利要求要求电脑执行除运算以外的操作，电脑本身不能保证专利的有效性。但是“如果一台电脑可以通过一种更有效，更具体的方式来完成人类完成的工作，记载这项技术方案的专利就是有效的，因为即使仅仅速度上的提升就可以作为一种有效的限制条件。仅仅需要在权利要求中将抽象概念通过通用电脑或专用电脑与具体的实施方式联系起来。比如，一个发明人可能在一项权利要求中记载了一项通过导线，半导体，电容等具体电子器件来实施的将汉语翻译成英语的技术方案。这种复杂，互联的元器件组合符合专利法第101条的要求，不必担心抽象性的问题。随着科技的发展，电子产品已经从庞大专门运算单元的真空管，发展到通用穿孔卡，再到现在的手持电子可编程器件，电子产品依旧不是“抽象的”。
3. Don’t start by distilling the “abstract idea,” “gist,” or “heart” of the invention. A claim cannot be stripped down, simplified, generalized, or paraphrased to remove all of its concrete limitations, until at its core, something that could be characterized as an abstract idea is revealed. The claim as a whole must be considered. “A court cannot go hunting for abstractions by ignoring the concrete, palpable, tangible limitations of the invention the patentee actually claims.” Rader Op. at 13.
3.不能提取一项发明的“抽象概念”“主旨”或“核心”。一项专利不能被剥离，简化，概括或演绎，不能去掉它的所有具体的限制，使专利只剩下它的“核心”，即所谓的“抽象概念”。必须考虑一项权利要求的整体性。“法庭不能忽视专利的权利要求中具体，明白，可感知的限制，只关注那些“抽象概念”。
4. Judge Lourie incorrectly dismisses In re Alappat because “the world of technology has changed” and the “Supreme Court has spoken since Alappat on the question of patent eligibility.” Lourie Op. at 37-38. There is no time limit on Alappat. And, patent eligibility is determined as of the patent’s filing date – not whether technology has changed such that technology today would make what’s claimed from the early 1990s patent ineligible. Rader Op. at 20, fn. 4. Claims also do not become abstract simply through passage of time. Moore Op. at 6.
4.Lourie法官错误地否定了In re Alappat 判例的原则，其理由是“世界的科技已经发生了改变”和“最高法院在In re Alappat案后对于专利有效性已经有了新的说明”。但是，对于 Alappat判例的适用没有时间限制。同时，专利的有效性是在申请时决定的——不会因为科技的进步而使专利的有效性发生改变，当今的技术不能使20世纪90年代的专利无效。一项有效的权利要求也不会时间的流逝而变成抽象概念。
Quite the contrary, the principles of Alappat are right on point. The combination of machine and software “creates a new machine, because a general purpose computer in effect becomes a special purpose computer once it is programmed to perform particular functions pursuant to instructions from program software.” Rader Op. at 27. As Judge Lourie would have it, “At its most basic, a computer is just a calculator capable of performing mental steps faster than a human could. Unless the claims require a computer to perform operations that are not merely accelerated calculations, a computer does not itself confer patent eligibility.” Lourie Op. at 27. However, “f a computer can do what a human can in a better, specifically limited way, it could be patent eligible…even an increase in speed alone may be sufficient to result in a meaningful limitation.” Rader Op. at 29, fn.7. All that is required is that the claims tie an otherwise abstract idea to a specific way of doing something with a computer, or a specific computer for doing something. Rader Op. at 21. For instance, an inventor could claim the abstract idea of translating Chinese into English through a combination of circuitry, transistors, capacitors, and other tangible electronic components. Such complex, interrelated machine components would squarely fit within the broad categories of §101, without any concern about claiming an abstract idea. Well, the fact that innovation has allowed these machines to move from vacuum-tube-filled specialized mechanical behemoths, to generalized machines changed bypunch cards, to electronically programmable machines that can fit in the palm of one’s hand, does not render them abstract. Rader Op. at 28-29.
恰恰相反，Alappat 判例在这个案件中适用。机器和软件的结合“创造了一种新的机器，因为当一台电脑在软件的驱动下实现特殊的功能时，这台电脑就从一般用途的电脑变成了特殊用途的电脑。正如 Lourie法官所说：“从根本上说，电脑仅仅是一台能比人类更快地执行智能运算的机器。除非权利要求要求电脑执行除运算以外的操作，电脑本身不能保证专利的有效性。但是“如果一台电脑可以通过一种更有效，更具体的方式来完成人类完成的工作，记载这项技术方案的专利就是有效的，因为即使仅仅速度上的提升就可以作为一种有效的限制条件。仅仅需要在权利要求中将抽象概念通过通用电脑或专用电脑与具体的实施方式联系起来。比如，一个发明人可能在一项权利要求中记载了一项通过导线，半导体，电容等具体电子器件来实施的将汉语翻译成英语的技术方案。这种复杂，互联的元器件组合符合专利法第101条的要求，不必担心抽象性的问题。随着科技的发展，电子产品已经从庞大专门运算单元的真空管，发展到通用穿孔卡，再到现在的手持电子可编程器件，电子产品依旧不是“抽象的”。
With these principles in mind, the court must examine each system claim as a whole, and despite falling within the plain language of §101, whether there is clear and convincing evidence showing that a claim to a computer-implemented invention is barred from patent eligibility by reason of the narrow judicial prohibition against claiming an abstract idea. Here, the system claims include at least four separate structural components: a computer, a first party device, a data storage unit, and a communications controller coupled via machine components to the computer and the first party device. The patent discloses at least 32 figures which provide detailed algorithms for the software with which such hardware is to be programmed. As one example, Figure 16 details the confirmation algorithm which includes creating transactions in the payment shadow file, checking for successful consideration payment, determining the required consideration amount being available in the payment shadow file, and electronically adjusting accounts after ensuring that the first and/or second parties have adequate value in their accounts. Rader Op. at 30-34. “Labeling this system claim an ‘abstract concept’ wrenches all meaning from those words, and turns a narrow exception into one which may swallow the expansive rule (and with it much of the investment and innovation in software).” Rader Op. at 34. There are also means-plus-function elements recited in dependent claims that are limited to the specific algorithms disclosed in the specification for performing the recited function. Moore Op. at 13-14.
基于以上标准，法庭必须将每项系统权利要求视为一个整体进行检验，即使字面意思上权利要求是抽象概念，也要看利用电脑实施的技术方案的权利要求中是否包含有效的限制保证其不属于专利法101条规定的不能授予专利权的课题。系统权利要求包括四项独立的器件：一台电脑，一台第一部分设备，一个数据存储单元，一台通过机器零件与电脑和第一部分设备连接的控制器。该专利至少公开了32幅图片，用于解释驱动软件所用的算法。图16详细介绍了确认算法，包括在支付阴影文件中生成交易，查找支付意向，确定支付阴影文件所需金额，并在确认第一部分或第二部分中有足够金额后确定账单。将这项系统权利要求解释为“抽象概念“曲解了它的意思，而且会将一个很窄的免责范围扩大化，使行业利益受大极大的损失（软件行业的投资和创新会受到很大的影响）。在独立权利要求**能实施部分还增加了“装置加方法”部分来进行限制。
Clearly, these system claims do not claim a disembodied abstract idea of an escrow. Instead, the system claims go beyond merely claiming an escrow by integrating transactions in a data processing system that includes a data storage unit coupled to a computer which has been modified by software to receive transactions, adjust records, and generate electronic instructions according to specific structural limitations in both software and hardware formats. The abstract idea of an escrow can be conducted without the claimed system. Even conducting an escrow with a computer, there are other ways it could be done without the claimed system (no preemption). Rader Op. at 35-36. Stated differently, the use of a computer is not inherent in conducting an escrow. There is also no clear and convincing evidence as of the critical time that the claimed functional features are inherent in an escrow. Rader Op. at 36. As such, Judges Rader, Linn, Moore and O’Malley find the system claims patent eligible under §101.
很明显，这些系统权利要求不只是记载了一种escrow的抽象概念。实际上，系统权利要求不仅仅记载了escrow这个概念，而是记载了一个通过数据处理系统来整合各种交易的escrow实体，数据处理系统包括数据存储单元和一台电脑，该电脑安装了用于接受交易，更新记录，并在特定的软件和硬件形式的限制下产生各种指令。仅仅一个escrow的抽象概念的实施没必要使用该权利要求记载的技术方案。即使使用电脑实施escrow，也可以有权利要求记载的技术方案以外的方式来实施。也就是说，使用电脑并不是操作escrow所必须的。也没有清晰可信的证据证明权利要求中的技术特征是escrow的内在特征。基于以上理由，Rader, Linn, Moore 和 O’Malley 法官认为系统权利要求符合美国专利法101条的规定。
In a general sense, a general purpose computer would pass muster under §101. “Why, then, would claiming the same computer with specific programming (thus creating a special purpose computer), transform a patent-eligible machine into a patent-ineligible abstract idea? A claim to a computer running particular software is no less a claim to a computer.” Moore Op. at 9. If Alice’s system claims “do not clear the §101 hurdle, then the abstract idea exception will be an insurmountable bar for innovators of software, financial systems and business methods, as well as for those in the telecommunications filed. Every software patent makes a computer perform different functions – that is the purpose of software. Each software program creates a special purpose machine, a machine which did not previously exist (assuming the software is novel). The machine ceases to be a general purpose computer when it is running the software. It does not, however, by virtue of the software it is running, become an abstract idea.” Moore Op. at 14.
通常情况下，一台一般用途的电脑符合专利法101条的要求。“那么，为什么当一台电脑安装了特定的软件后，就从一台可以申请专利的机器变成了不能申请专利的“抽象概念”了呢？一项运行特定软件的电脑的权利要求依旧是一项电脑的权利要求。”如果爱丽丝公司的系统权利要求“无法符合专利法第101条的要求。那利用抽象概念对软件专利提出无效请求就会成为软件业创新无法逾越的障碍，对金融系统专利和商业方法专利以及众多的通信行业的专利也有巨大的影响。所有的软件专利记载的技术方案都是利用软件使电脑成为一台特定的机器的——这是软件本来的用途。所有的程序创造出一台特定用途的机器，一台从前没有存在过的机器（假设软件具有新颖性）。当电脑安装了软件以后它就不再是一台普通意义上的机器。但是，安装了软件并不会使电脑成为一个抽象概念”。
For the same reasons the systems claims are patent eligible, Judges Linn and O’Malley also find the method claims and computer readable claims patent eligible. There was no claims construction at the districtcourt. There was no Markman hearing. This en banc review follows from a summary judgment determination of §101 patent ineligibility before any briefing on claims construction even started. Linn Op. at 2. As for claims construction, the parties (more importantly, CLS Bank) stipulated that the method claims are narrowed by incorporation of all electronic aspects of the system claims. Linn Op. at 8. CLS Bank also stipulated to a claims construction favorable to Alice. Linn Op. at 3. Based on the parties’ stipulations and agreements, the trial court construed, for the purposes of the summary judgment motion from which this en banc rehearing arises, the method and media claims to require all the computer-implemented limitations of the system claims. Linn Op. at 11-12. Based on this procedural history, Judges Linn and O’Malley finds all the claims patent eligible for the same reasons the system claims are patent eligible.
根据同样的理由，Linn 和 O’Malley法官认为系统权利要求和方法权利要求以及电脑实施权利要求都是有效的。在地方法院并没有进行权项解释。也没有进行马克曼听证。en banc 程序甚至没有对权利要求进行简要说明就依据根据专利法101条判定权利要求是无效的。权项解释(由CLS Bank做出的权项解释)中指明：将系统权利要求中的电子部分加入到方法权利要求中限定了方法权利要求的范围。CLS Bank也提出了一个对爱丽丝公司有利的权项解释。为了该审判结果提供依据，审判法庭基于先前的认定和协议得出方法和媒体权利要求均在系统权利要求的电脑实施的限制的范围内。根据以上的程序，Judges Linn 和O’Malley法官以与认定系统权利要求有效相同的理由，认定所有的权利要求是有效的。
Judge Newman would also find all the claims patent eligible. Newman Op. at 14. However, Judge Newman proposes ditching the failed §101 ventures into abstraction, preemption, and meaningfulness. Newman Op. at 13. Both Judges Newman and Rader emphasize sticking with the statute. Newman Op. at 3-4; Rader Reflections at 4. Section 101 is an inclusive statement of patent eligible subject matter. It should not be used to impose an initial arbitrary bar on patentability based on “abstractness” and “preemption” that are nebulous concepts requiring legal gymnastics to figure out. Substantive considerations of patentability should be left to 35 USC §§112, 102, and 103. Newman Op. at 4. “Moreover, to inject the patentability test of ‘inventiveness’ into the separate statutory concept of subject matter eligibility makes this doctrine again ‘the plaything of the judges who, as they became initiated into its mysteries, delighted to devise and expound their own ideas of what it meant; some very lovely prose resulting.’” Rader Reflections at 5 (citing Giles S. Rich, Principles of Patentability, 28 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 393, 404 (1960)).
Newman法官本来也应该认定所有的权利要求是有效的。但是，她建议不再按照专利法第101条对专利的抽象性，概括性和意义进行评估。但Newman和Rader法官强调应该遵守基本的原则。专利法第101条是一条笼统的判断专利有效性的标准。本案是一件基于“抽象性”和“概括性”等模糊的概念提出的无效宣告，需要更具体的法律条文来指导，这时专利法101条就不再适用。对于有效性实质上的判断应该利用专利法112，102和103条。“另外，将专利有效性判断加入到法律概念中使得法律变成“法官的游戏，法官被法律迷惑，并会根据自己的理解做出一些可笑的解释”。
Only Congre****an step in to refine software patent law, if necessary (see, e.g., Linn Op. at 12-14). Until that happens, we still have (or some would say “are stuck with”) the Supreme Court’s decisions regarding patent eligibility under §101. As for this case, although this is an en banc decision, the only “judgment” by the Federal Circuit in this case is the one-paragraph Per Curiam Judgment in which a majority of the court agrees that Alice’s method and computer readable medium claims recite patent ineligible subject matter (but without majority agreement as to the legal rationale for that conclusion), and the court is evenly split (5-5) regarding the patent eligibility of the system claims (thereby affirming, by default, the lower court’s holding of patent ineligibility of the system claims). Recently confirmed Judge Taranto did not participate, and the other two presidential nominees (Raymond Chen and Todd Hughes) are still awaiting Senate confirmation. Without a majority supporting any one of the other 6 separate opinions, where does this leave us with this en banc decision? “[T]hough much is published today discussing the proper approach to the patent eligibility inquiry, nothing said today beyond our [per curiam] judgment has the weight of precedent.” Rader Op. at 2, fn.1.
只有国会才有权在需要的时候修改软件专利法。在这之前，我们依旧要面对最高法院关于软件专利有效性的判例。在这个案例中，联邦巡回法院做出的唯一判决是一项一段的由全体法官作出的判决，指出爱丽丝公司的方法权利要求和电脑可读介质权利要求列举了不能授予专利权的标的物（但这项判决的理由并没有得到过半数的支持）。最近确认，Taranto并没有参与，而另外两位候选人（Raymond Chen 和Todd Hughes)是否参与，还在等待参议院的通知。虽然对于专利的有效性的判定方法有了很多的报道，但是还没有确切的消息证明法院的这项决定对我们现在有什么影响。”
Since nothing other than the one paragraph Per Curiam Judgment is precedent, it may be business as usual for patent practitioners, PTO examiners, and district court judges until some more objective and clear guidance on the “abstract ideas” analysis for patent ineligibility under §101 is provided, perhaps in another Federal Circuit decision (maybe in the Supreme Court’s remand of Ultramercial v. Hulu to the Federal Circuit for further consideration in light of Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289 (2012)) or by another Supreme Court decision (maybe by taking up this case). With two dozen amici curiae briefs submitted prior to this decision, there is certainly plenty of interest in the industry for more/better guidance.
既然除了那一段判决，联邦巡回法庭没有给出更多明确的结论，那么在更加具体明确的结论出台以前，专利代理，专利商标的申请和地方法庭的审判都要照常进行，也许以后联邦巡回法庭或最高法庭就会出台明确的结论。有24位法人通过法庭之友提供了意见，为抽象概念的判别提供更好的标准将会给产业带来更大的收益。
注释：
注释：
1：en banc程序就是法院的全体法官共同审理一个案件，通常用于处理有影响的案件。
2：escrow一种委托付款服务。
3：Markman Hearing自从1 9 9 6 年4月23日联邦巡回上诉法院作出Markman v WestviewInstruments判决以来，在美国的专利侵权诉讼中就增加了一个程序，在开庭前进行权项解释听证会，通常称为马克曼听证（Markman Hearing)。
作者介绍：Written by John P. Kong
Westerman Hattori Daniels & Adrian, LLP
（该文章用于交流和学习使用，请尊重原作者权利，禁止以商业目的转载，转载请注明原作者以及来源于思博）
（本人能力有限，翻译难免有不足之处，请轻拍，共同进步
）
作者介绍：Written by John P. Kong
Westerman Hattori Daniels & Adrian, LLP
（该文章用于交流和学习使用，请尊重原作者权利，禁止以商业目的转载，转载请注明原作者以及来源于思博）
（本人能力有限，翻译难免有不足之处，请轻拍，共同进步
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